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Introduction
When our coal mines are exhausted, the prosperity and glory of this flourishing and
fortunate  island  are  at  an  end.  Our  cities  and  great  towns  must  then  become
ruinous heaps for want of fuel, and our mines and manufactories must fail from the
same  cause,  and  then  consequently  our  commerce  must  vanish.  In  short,  the
commerce, wealth, importance, glory, and happiness of Great Britain will decay and
gradually dwindle to nothing, in proportion as our coal and other mines fail; and
the future inhabitants of this island must live, like its first inhabitants, by fishing
and hunting.1 
1 In  this  excerpt  from his  Natural  History  of  the  Mineral  Kingdom  (1789),  John  Williams
expressed one of  the first  concerns about coal  shortage and its consequences on the
British future. Few countries indeed relied so exclusively on a single source of energy for
all their needs. As early as 1620, according to Paul Warde, about half of the country’s
energy needs were met by coal.  This  figure reached 77 % in 1800 and 95 % in 1900.2
England can thus be viewed as an extreme case of energy servitude to coal in the 19th
century. What changed from the end of the 18th century onwards was the growing use of
coal in industry and the shift from an organic economy to a fossil-based one.3 From then
on, coal was not only used for domestic purposes and in a few industrial sectors (mainly
the textile and iron industries), it progressively became the staple of the British economy.
Concerns about coal, its supply and its effects on the daily life of the population, had, up
to then, been mainly local: William Cavert has devoted a brilliant analysis on how it came
to be  a  major  issue  for  Londoners  in  the  17th and 18 th centuries. 4 Afterwards,  these
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concerns were extended to a national scale and, as John Williams’s excerpt testifies, they
questioned the duration of Britain’s supremacy.
2 From this moment onwards, worries about a possible shortage of coal were expressed
every now and then; they reached a properly political dimension in 1829-1830 when the
state of the coal trade was discussed. Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, whose work focuses on
this issue up to the end of the 1860s, has shown how two rival futures for coal competed
throughout the period and fed on each other for their development – one favouring the
optimistic view of quasi-inexhaustible supplies, the other warning of dark times to come
when coal became exhausted.5 These fears were for instance reactivated in the mid-1840s,
when PM Robert Peel abolished the coal duties that he had revived a few years earlier.
The  passing  thought  of  shortage  was  also  expressed  by  The  Times in  1849  upon the
opening of the new building of the London Coal Exchange: “if not the single element of our
mercantile and political superiority, coal is at least absolutely essential; and could we suppose such
an event as the exhaustion of the beds, it would be the final and utter catastrophe of our greatness”
.6 
3 Early in the century, then, the British elites were fully aware of the fearful dependence of
the country on its coal supplies. But this issue was never really tackled; it came and went
according to the social or political agenda. The first explanation for such behaviour is of
course the invisibility of the issue: coal was abundant and cheap, and no scarcity was
usually felt; worries were only expressed when coal prices increased. But, and this is the
second  explanation,  these  worries  were  soon  appeased  by  the  experts’  estimates  of
remaining supplies. Even though the predicted life-lengths of coalfields strongly varied
from one expert to the other,7 they tended to be reassuring – and the very variations of
these  predictions  highlighted  the  technical  problems  they  faced,  and  therefore  the
likelihood of far more coal beds than expected. Finally, the mere scale of the problem –
how can a society deal with its utter dependence on a single energy source – made it
nearly impossible to imagine any way out.
4 So, up to the 1860s, the issue of coal shortage and dependence was at the same time
perceived and marginalised. What I propose to discuss in this article is how and why this
changed in the 1860s-1870s, when this issue was more discussed than ever, even though it
ended up being cast aside once more. To do so, I will rely on the vast literature that
appeared at the time on the topic, whether in the press, in books or in political speeches
and parliamentary papers.
 
I. The early 1870s: when long- and short-term fears
converge
5 At the beginning of the 1870s, the visibility of what became known as “the coal question”
was increased and more difficult than ever to ignore by the population at large. This was
mainly due to the convergence of two different kinds of fears: long-term and short-term
ones. This distinction was made by the medieval historian Jean Delumeau to differentiate
between the well-thought-out fears expressed by intellectuals and politicians, and the
spontaneous and momentary panics of more common people.8 In the case of coal in the 19
th century, such a frame of analysis can be applied to distinguish the climate of anxiety
created by economists, geologists or politicians, who reflected upon coal supply and its
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future scarcity since the late 1700s, and the short-term panics born out of coal shortage
and high prices.
 
1) A renewed anxiety about coal shortage
6 The  long-term  anxiety  about  coal  shortage  was  renewed  and  strengthened  by  the
publication in 1865,  by the economist  Stanley Jevons,  of  The Coal  Question,9 in which,
basing his calculations not on geological estimates only, but also on economic laws and
tendencies,  he  gave  Britain  a  mere  100  years  left  of  coal  supplies  before  decline.10
According to him, a continuous growing demand for coal would exhaust British resources
more quickly than expected.11 This triggered considerable anxieties, that were echoed in
the  general  or  specialised  press:  The  Times,  The  Economist,  The  Saturday  Review,  The
Quarterly Review, all commented upon it;12 the Colliery Guardian proposed throughout the
year 1866 articles on “National  Prosperity dependent on national  resources”,13 on “the coal
supply of Europe and America”,14 on the “coal supply”15 or on “the coal panic”.16
7 All  the  books  dealing  with  coal  mentioned  Jevons’s  theories,  whether  to  support  or
question them. To take but one example, the eminent geologist Sir Warrington Wilkinson
Smyth, in his 1867 Treatise on Coal and Coal Mining, mentions that “public attention has been
forcibly called (…) to the question of the duration of the coal fields” and that “the time for prudent
forethought has arrived”.17
8 The issue was even discussed in Parliament, where PM Gladstone and John Stuart Mill
commented upon Jevons’ conclusions and asked for enquiries. The same mechanism as in
previous and similar circumstances was applied: a Royal Commission on coal supply was
appointed  in  1866  and  handed  its  22-volume  conclusions  in  1871.  These  were  very
reassuring:  the main conclusion of  the report  was that  Jevons had been mistaken in
considering an increase of consumption in the future at the same rate as previous years.
And even if coal consumption did increase so, there would still be more than 300 hundred
years of coal supply for the country – whereas if consumption remained what it was in
1871, there would be coal for more than one and a half thousand years.18 This, as previous
estimates had done, should have considerably alleviated the fears, and the coal question
should  have  been  dismissed  once  again  and  disappeared  for  a  while.  But  this  time,
something else happened.
 
2) When dependence is felt: the coal famine
9 A dependence, a servitude, becomes visible in times of want; one only feels an addiction19
when the addicting product is missing: this is exactly what happened between 1871 and
1873,  when  coal  prices  started  to  increase  dramatically.  Even  though  there  was  no
uniform price of coal in the country, Roy Church has calculated that average pit prices
more than doubled between 1870 and 1873.20 According to a coal merchant, the price of a
ton of coal in London went from 18.6 shillings in 1870 to more than 32 shillings in 1873.21
According to Roy Church, these were the highest prices ever reached by coal in the 19th
century, despite peaks in 1837, 1847 and 1854, and later in 1890 and 1900. The sufferings
of the population were therefore intense, in London as well as in other towns deprived of
local and more easily available coal. This was the time when the phrase “Old King Coal”,
popularised in 1859 in a poem by Charles Mackay in the Illustrated London News,22 was
more widely used to describe a tyrannical sovereign.23 On March 1873, for instance, the
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magazine Fun published a terrifying drawing in which King Coal sat on a heap of coal
sacks, watching children dying of cold and starvation. A poem accompanied the picture,
warning that:
Old King Coal
Is a knowing old droll
A knowing old droll is he:
For he’s paying no wages and profits they roll
In fast, at the prices that be.
Fifty-four, fifty-five, fifty-six, go the prices
And he doesn’t care
For the deep despair
Of the sons of penury.24
 
“Old King Coal”,
10 Growing discontent was perceptible in the population, leading to what was called at the
time “indignation meetings”.25 They took place all over the country from February 1873
onwards,  when coal  prices were increasing very quickly.  For instance,  on the 24th of
February 7 to 8 000 people gathered in Nottingham to complain about the situation,26 and
in London, meetings took place in Trafalgar Square or in Clerkenwell.27
11 It was not the first time, of course, that the population suffered from high coal prices:
William Cavert has shown such hardships in 17th or 18th-century London for instance.28
But in 1871-1873, the “famine” as it was called lasted longer than expected, and did not
occur at a time of national crisis: there was no war or specific catastrophe to justify it.
Moreover, it was the first time that it happened just when the country was wondering
how long coal would last. Was it not the proof that Jevons was finally right, earlier than
expected,  and that Britain’s doom was close? Finally,  this was the time when Britain
entered a period of doubts about its model, of anxiety about the future of its race and
therefore of the country itself; a time also when considerable worries about urban evils
were expressed. Fears of the mob and of decline combined to heighten the awareness of
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public authorities and analysts. For all these reasons, this year was certainly a turning
point in the thoughts about British dependence on coal.29
 
II. The temporary failure of marginalisation
1) A Committee to fight “delusions”
12 This  time,  indeed,  the  issue  took  time  to  be  cast  aside.  After  some  hesitations,30
Parliament appointed a Select Committee on Dearness and Scarcity that started working
in late February 1873, and handed its report as early as July 1873. It acted therefore rather
fast, certainly in order to calm the growing agitation and the rather unpleasant suspicion
that was spreading among the population of the existence of a “coal ring” uniting coal-
owners and merchants who were speculating on the rise in prices. In the House of Lords,
the Duke of Richmond had warned that “men were suffering greatly, and might not remain
quiet much longer. Government should look into it”.31 The Committee explained the rise in
prices by two reasons: a slight reduction in production, due to a Mines Regulation Act
(1872),  which  reduced  working  hours  for  miners,  and  a  strong  increase  in  demand,
induced by a prosperous iron industry following the American Civil War and the Franco-
Prussian war.32 But more fundamentally, the report stated that 
the coal trade (has) been no exception to the violent fluctuations which arise when
the ordinary course of business is disturbed on account of unusually high prices, by
panic demands for the moment, and speculation for the rise or fall.33 
13 Therefore, the purpose of this Committee was, from the beginning, to “dissipate many
popular delusions as to (…) the high price of coal”.34 This was repeated over and over again in
the press, and in Parliament, not least by those who had set up the Committee35, and who
hoped that it would “remove a considerable amount of misapprehension which prevailed in the
public mind on this subject”.36 None of the MPs or Lords favouring the Committee seemed to
think it would or should propose any solution: the natural laws of the market would,
sooner or later, adjust the prices at a reasonable level. But the Committee could at least
destroy the irrationality of the masses, and therefore not only appease the social climate,
but also help reducing the prices, as it was the panic itself which was partly responsible
for their increase.
 
2) The panic continues
14 In that matter, the Committee clearly failed. People were expecting results and action,
not  explanations.  The  indignation  meetings  continued  well  after  the  report,  and
especially in September 1873, when prices were still high and winter was coming closer.37
Some of the protesters deemed the report insufficient, and proposed to establish a new
group, led by the Lord Mayor of London, to offer solutions.38 The agitation ceased only at
the end of the year, when prices finally decreased “naturally”.
15 One should of course distinguish between the panic of the population at large, deprived of
coal, and who only asked for measures to reduce prices, and the anxiety of those who saw
in this crisis the proof of Britain’s unbearable allegiance to King Coal and the dangers of
coal exhaustion. Both were expressed at the time, and the second was longer to calm
down: it was discussed throughout the year 1873, and even later in 1874, in the general
and more specialised press, in books and pamphlets, in papers given at learned societies
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and  scientific  associations.  A  telling  example  is  the  second  edition  of  Warrington
Wilkinson Smyth’s Treatise on Coal,  which was published after the report of the Royal
Commission on coal supplies, and contained a second preface written in July 1872; in this
text, the author at the same time supports the views of the Commission, and qualifies
them, mentioning an “intricate problem” and the “more or less uncertainty” attached to such
calculations.39 Far more critical was a long article in the Contemporary Review written in
1874 by a  radical  industrialist,  writer  and journalist,  William Rathbone Greg entitled
“Rocks Ahead;  or,  The Warnings of  Cassandra”.  Greg presented the 1873 famine as a
warning of what would happen if coal became too expensive, and bluntly stated that “our
coal is in process of exhaustion; it is daily and by a natural process becoming less abundant, and in
consequence less cheap”.40 The most commented upon of all the warnings was nonetheless
the presidential address given by Sir William Armstrong to the North of England Institute
of Mining and Mechanical Engineers in January 1873; he lamented the high prices of coal
and  their  consequences  for  the  poorest  part  of  the  population,  and  denounced  the
considerable  waste  of  this  fuel,  both  in  production  and  consumption,  that  would
accelerate the rate of exhaustion of British coal-fields.41
16 Magazines like Fun started to imagine a future where coal would be so dear that people
would  admire  the  exhibition  of  a  “Coalinoor” or  would  stay  in  bed  or  gather  in
cooperatives to warm themselves together around a brazier.42 Others, like The Spectator
denounced these alarming thoughts which made things worse: “little use is it to speculate
over the probable speedy exhaustion of our coal-fields, for alarm spread upon that ground could
only have the effect of making prices rise still more.”43
17 Antoine Missemer has shown that Jevons and others saw indeed the 1873 coal famine as
an example of what would happen in case of a gradual exhaustion of the mines. He has
also analysed a debate that took place in 1878 at the Statistical Society, in which Jevons’s
book  and  warnings  were  accused  to  have  contributed  to  the  famine  by  triggering
speculation on a rise of coal prices.44
18 Even though prices decreased indeed in 1874, something changed afterwards: the average
increase in coal prices in the following decades tended to be slightly higher than the
general inflation, reversing the trend of previous years.45 The issue, moreover, came back
more regularly in the following decades; it got a name from Jevons, “the Coal question”,
and reappeared each time prices were increasing in 1890 or 1900 for instance.
 
III. An ideology of powerlessness
19 It should be understood, nonetheless, why, in the end, nothing was really done to tackle
the issue of coal shortage despite all those warnings. Even though coal was a dirty energy
source, that created health problems and terrible and lethal smogs,46 there was no real
policy that was implemented to offer substitutes. This was, I think, deeply grounded in
what I would call an ideology of powerlessness inducing a policy of inaction. Such an
ideology would comprise three main dimensions.
 
1) An indomitable faith in progress
20 The first dimension is the faith in progress and technique to solve all problems. After all,
in the worst scenario – Jevons’  – there would still  be about a hundred years of  coal
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available, and that would leave ample time for innovation. The wonders of the time –
electricity mainly, but also the telephone, cars, etc. – and all the changes brought by the
19th century comforted this belief that solutions to the coal question would be found by
scientists and inventors. Admittedly, this faith in progress became challenged in the last
third of the century by 'back to nature' movements and the observation that the promises
of abundance of the previous decades had not been met.47 Machines were indeed bringing
some new evils and pollution, and steam engines perhaps more than others. But despite
those  criticisms,  the  global  faith  in  technology  as  the  best  chance  to  solve  Britain’s
problems remained unchallenged. This can be viewed for instance in the multiplication of
utopias after the 1870s, most of which dealt with the issue of energy sources and coal.48
The great majority of them relied on technology to imagine the future, and only a few –
though often the best ones – could be seen as more critical and antimodernist.49 In such a
frame of mind, there was no need either to worry or to act, as the laws of economics and
the natural inventiveness of mankind would offer solutions in due time. This was, for
instance, the position of Henry Hussey Vivian, a powerful Welsh industrialist and one of
the members of the 1866 Royal Commission, who scoffed at the idea of an impending
exhaustion of coal.50 In that sense, he perfectly embodied the beliefs of most industrialists
at the time. 
 
2) The issue of export duties on coal
21 These industrialists also agreed on a common defence of free trade. This is indeed the
second dimension of the ideology of powerlessness: the deep-rooted faith in free trade
and free enterprise, absolutely limiting any interference from the State.51 In the 1873
crisis, as mentioned earlier,  no political  solution was offered.  In a letter to the Lord
Provost of Glasgow, PM Gladstone confided: “The attention of Parliament is now fairly fixed on
the question of the coal supply: & this is all that I can say, for I do not see my way to specific
remedies by the action of the Government”.52 This was also the reason why Gladstone had
refused, in the first place, any Parliamentary Committee on the dearness of coal in early
February 1873, before surrendering to the pressure of his fellow MPs.
22 And yet, even though free trade became a national ideology, shared by most citizens of
the  UK,  it  never  remained  unchallenged,  and  fears  of  coal  shortage  like  the  one
experienced between 1871 and 1873 reveal it clearly. Robert Peel had abolished taxes on
coal export as early as 1845, and they were reintroduced briefly in 1901 before being
abolished again in 1906. Meanwhile, coal could be exported freely. It was also exported
more and more massively: in 1830, only 1.6% of coal output (i.e. 0.5 million tons) was
exported; this figure rose to 9.8% in 1869 (10.9 millions tons) and 26.8% in 1913 (77 million
tons).53 This is why many questioned the free-trade policy on the grounds of a growing
fear of coal shortage. If coal was the staple of British economy, should it be allowed to
flow  out  of the  country  without  checks?  Wasn’t  it  too  precious  to  be  given  so
inexpensively to rival nations? This issue was raised at the beginning of the 1870s, from
different places. Popular meetings, of course, voiced their indignation at seeing coal leave
the country when it was so dear in Britain. On the 6th of March 1873, an Irish Liberal MP
asked during such a meeting for an export duty on coal, arguing that it was not contrary
to his defence of free trade generally. Coal was exceptional, and should be treated as such.
54 A  few days  before,  someone reminded that  Prime Minister  Gladstone  himself  had
defended such a tax in 1842, when he was Vice-President of the Board of Trade.55 Because
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of its  numerous trade agreements with other European countries,  it  was difficult  for
Britain to impose such a tax, so it was suggested that Parliament should be petitioned to
renegotiate these treaties.56 Many of the protesters were concerned with the isolated
position of Britain, who was more and more standing alone in its absolute defence of free
trade. 
23 Reciprocity and limited trade-protection for coal thus became the motto of the day.57 The
chairman  of  a  reciprocity  society  created  in  1868  asked  in  1873  to  maintain  free
competition inside Britain, but to limit it outside, especially in the case of coal.58 Even in
the House of Commons some MPs started to question Gladstone and the government on
the  opportunity  to  maintain  free  trade  for  coal.59 All  these  demands  were  naturally
dismissed by the authorities. 
24 Some great names nonetheless joined their voice to this demand. Sir Alfred R. Wallace
stands out among those. He fought for reciprocity and a duty on coal from this moment
up to the end of the century. In a letter to the Daily News, he addressed the problem not
only from an economic point of view, but also from a moral one:
I maintain that it is wrong to our own population, and a still greater wrong to the
next generation, to permit the unlimited export of those mineral products which
are absolute necessaries of life, but which, once destroyed, we can never reproduce.
To do so is to sell and alienate for ever a portion of our land itself.60
25 Wallace’s letter is another example of the acute sense of the limited supply of fossil fuels
that ran accross Britain throughout the 19th century. This growing challenge to free trade
could also  be  understood as  a  shift  of  generation and ideology in  the Liberal  Party.
Gladstonian Liberalism, based on financial orthodoxy and state abstention, was contested
by a more interfering kind of liberalism: the election of Joseph Chamberlain as mayor of
Birmingham in 1873 and the ensuing municipal gospel based on the supplying of cheap
staple commodities like water and gas which could be seen as a powerful symbol of these
new public expectations.61
 
3) No help from abroad
26 Hoping for a supply of coal from abroad, whether from other independent countries or
from the British Empire, was no solution either. Indeed, what mattered was the upholding
of cheap coal produced in Britain, so that the country could maintain its industrial and
commercial supremacy over the world. The increase of the American output of coal, for
instance, was a source of worry, not of relief, especially when it came to overcome the
British one around 1900.62 Similarly, politicians and economists started to be concerned
about coal exports to the British Empire. Yet, these may have been encouraged in the
course of a “fossil imperialism” led by Britain to integrate its colonies to a worldwide
economy that it dominated.63 On Barak has shown how this applied for instance in the
case of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt: Britain encouraged the consumption of its coal,
and used it as ballast in its steamboats for exports.64 Of course, when the concerns about
coal supply became acute, the situation was somewhat complicated. In India, for instance,
the local  production of  coal  was  encouraged in the wake of  the massive building of
railways in the country following the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857-1858. But the Raj was still
partly supplied by British coal, up to a third of its consumption according to Valentine
Ball in 1881.65 Some hoped that the coal produced in the dominions for instance would
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compensate for a near exhaustion of the British fields, forgetting once again that this
would in no way maintain the comparative advantage of cheap coal for Britain. 
27 There was therefore no help to expect from abroad in the matter of coal dependence and
in the quest for a way out. In that matter, Britain was alone – or, rather, far too integrated
in the world economy it had created to expect any reprieve.
 
4) A sense of doom
28 The last justification for inaction was a sense of doom: yes, there would be a shortage of
coal  in  the  future,  and  the  people  of  the  time  thus  had  a  duty  towards  the  next
generations to at least reduce the National Debt, so that they would not have to cope with
that too. This was Gladstone’s, and most of the Liberals’ position as early as 1866. This
fatalism  can  be  explained  by  what  an  editorial  of  The  Times,  and  an  article  in  the
Contemporary Review depicted as the paradox of coal, faced by British people 66: as their
economy, and even their daily-life, depended on cheap coal, they desired low prices. But
these low prices tended to encourage waste and, more generally, consumption. Therefore,
the supply of coal was diminishing rapidly, quickening the moment when coal would
become more expensive due to its scarcity, and thus hastening the decline of the country.
In short,  Britain needed high coal  prices to preserve its coalfields and to extend the
period of  its  supremacy;  but the latter was based on low coal  prices… Very few real
solutions could be offered to get out of such an entanglement. There were only two which
really made sense, and both aimed at preserving coal so that Britain would remain the
greatest power as long as possible.
29 One  of  these  solutions  was  to  reduce  the  waste  of  coal  both  in  its  production  and
consumption.  Sir  William Armstrong,  in  the  presidential  address  mentioned  above,67
estimated that in steam engines and domestic consumption, half of the coal used was
wasted. It is, however, difficult to assess whether the calls for savings in coal that ensued
were heard and applied. Paul Warde has shown that the energy intensity of the British
economy started to improve - ie to decrease - from the second half of the 1870s, so only a
few years after these worries: they may have been heard after all68. Even if Armstrong’s
waste  estimates  were  sometimes  strongly  contested69,  his  views  were  supported  by
influential people. In 1873, for instance, a Society for the Promotion of Scientific Industry
was set up, and held its inaugural meeting in Manchester on the 16th of January 1874.70 It
organised this very year, with some success, an “exhibition of appliances for the economical
consumption  of  fuel” in  Peel  Park,  Salford. 71 But  here  again,  the  solution  to  the  coal
question  relied  exclusively  on  technical  innovations,  and  their  acceptance  by
industrialists and citizens alike.
30 Another, more original and largely unheard, proposal was made by Sir Rowland Hill, the
inventor of the penny post. A much admired man, he suggested at a meeting of the British
Association for the Advancement of Science in December 1873, to maintain high prices of
coal by implementing a coal tax, which would reduce waste; to make it bearable by the
population and neutral to the standard of living, it would replace other taxes.72 He was
joined by John Ball, a geologist and member of the Alpine Club in a letter to The Times,
who also defended relatively high prices of coal obtained by a tax on all coal raised.73 But I
have found little trace of debate about their ideas. At the meeting of the BAAS, Rowland
Hill’s proposal was ridiculed, and it was hardly discussed in the press.74 It was nonetheless
the only one to properly address the paradox of coal.
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 Conclusion
31 Coal shortage was thus a central issue for British society from the end of the 18th century
onwards;  it  became even more pressing with the coal  famine that  took place at  the
beginning of the 1870s, uniting long-term anxieties and the more immediate panic of a
want of fuel. It even gained an international recognition as the issue was discussed in
France for instance at the same time in books like Louis Simonin’s La Vie Souterraine,
published in 1867, or in the novel Les Indes Noires, by Jules Verne, that dealt at length with
the question of exhaustion.75 At the turn of the century, a whole book on the issue of the
British coal supply was published in Paris.76
32 Despite  this  publicity,  the  strong worries  that  were  expressed at  that  time,  and the
recognition of the extreme British dependence on coal, nothing was finally really done to
tackle the issue, except some efforts towards more efficiency in the use of the fuel. The
British addiction to coal ceased only gradually after the Second World War, to be replaced
by another one to oil and gas.77
33 What made the treatment of this environmental issue so difficult to find was the mere
scale of the changes required. In the course of the 19th century, coal had become the
cornerstone of a whole energetic system: British society was largely organised around the
supply of coal.  The economy depended on it:  Britain would only remain the greatest
power  as  long  as  its  coal  was  cheaper  and more  abundant  than in  other countries.
People’s daily life was based on it: fireplaces were often the only source of heat and had
the right size to burn coal.78 Hundreds of thousands of workers depended on it for their
living, directly or not.79 In a strongly polemical work, Timothy Mitchell has even argued
that democratic progress was enhanced by the political  and economic lever given to
miners, whose strikes could put the whole country to a halt.80 There was even a whole
cultural imagery associated with coal and smoke, mainly negative of course, but so deeply
entrenched as to be part of a global vision of the world.81 To change all this was of course
a titanic enterprise and required a state intervention at a level inconceivable for most
Victorian politicians.
34 The task was therefore left to science (and dreamers of anticipations) to offer solutions.
The British Science Guild created in 1905 aimed at applying the methods of science to all
social problems, and appointed a Conservation of Natural Sources of Energy Committee in
1909.82 In the 1920s, a “coal research club” was set up, and published from 1922 onwards a
journal entitled Fuel in science and practice. A journal of the scientific and economic use of fuels.
83
35 That the issue was nonetheless mainly political was asserted with increased vigour, when
schemes of nationalisation multiplied with the support of the Labour Party and Trade
Unions. The Miners’ Federation of Great Britain passed a resolution on state ownership in
1894, but it was only with the First World War and the momentary state control of mines
during the conflict that the measure grew in popularity and plausibility, at least among
workers, until its completion in 1946.84 
36 There are obvious parallels to be made with our current situation to fossil energies as a
whole and oil  in particular.  In our case also,  a  whole system has to be upset  to rid
ourselves of our fuel addiction. But a main difference remains: in the case of Britain, the
shortage was only national – there was still plenty of coal in the rest of the world – and its
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consequences would have been limited to a relative decline of the country, and certainly
not reached the complete catastrophe usually painted. In that sense, the current global
dimension of the issue of fossil fuels, and the environmental damages they create, are an
utterly new challenge faced by our societies.
37 Charles-François Mathis is Senior Lecturer in Modern History at Bordeaux Montaigne
University. His research focuses on the environmental and cultural history of the 19th
century. He chairs the French network of environmental historians, and is editor of the
“L’Environnement a une histoire” series (Champ Vallon edition). His publications include
In Nature We Trust (2010), La Ville Végétale (with E-A. Pépy, 2017), and Qu’avons-nous fait du
soleil? Mobilisation et  dépense de l’énergie du Moyen Âge à nos jours (ed.,  with G. Massard
Guilbaud, 2018).
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ABSTRACTS
Fears of coal shortage emerged in Great Britain at the end of the 18th century, when coal became
not only the basis of British people’s daily lives, but also the staple of their economy. At the
beginning of the 1870s, these fears intensified, following the publication of Stanley Jevons’s book
The Coal Question in 1865 and a very long and difficult coal famine. This made it more complicated
to put aside the fears of  shortage.  That nothing was finally done to tackle this  issue can be
explained by a strong faith in science (to solve all problems) and in free trade (even though it
began to be fiercely contested), but also by a sense of doom: getting out of a system entirely
based on coal demanded efforts that seemed overwhelming compared to the immediate dangers
of shortage or even pollution.
Les craintes d’une pénurie de charbon naissent en Grande-Bretagne à partir de la fin du XVIIIe
 siècle,  lorsque  cette  énergie  fossile  devient  le  fondement  non  seulement  du  quotidien  des
Britanniques, mais aussi de leur économie. Au début des années 1870, ces craintes s’intensifient à
la suite de l’ouvrage The Coal Question de Stanley Jevons, mais aussi d’une famine de charbon
particulièrement longue et difficile. La marginalisation de ces préoccupations devient ainsi plus
compliquée. Mais elle s’opère finalement, grâce à la persistance d’une foi techniciste forte, du
soutien au libre-échange (en dépit de résistances accentuées) et d’une forme de fatalisme liée aux
efforts énormes qu’il faudrait pour sortir d’un système tout entier organisé autour du charbon.
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